Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-review Collateral Proceedings: The Teachings of \u3cem\u3ePadilla, Chaidez\u3c/em\u3e, and \u3cem\u3eMartinez\u3c/em\u3e by Sharpless, Rebecca & Stanton, Andrew
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 67 
Number 4 Volume 67 Number 4 (Summer 2013) Article 5 
7-1-2013 
Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-review Collateral 
Proceedings: The Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez, and Martinez 
Rebecca Sharpless 
University of Miami School of Law, rsharpless@law.miami.edu 
Andrew Stanton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rebecca Sharpless and Andrew Stanton, Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-review Collateral 
Proceedings: The Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez, and Martinez, 67 U. Miami L. Rev. 795 (2013) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol67/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-
Review Collateral Proceedings: The
Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez
and Martinez
REBECCA SHARPLESS & ANDREW STANTON1
I. RETROACTIVrry ...................................................... 798
H. TEAGUE'S THRESHOLD QUESTION ....................................... 802
HI. INrrIAL-REvIEw COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS .............................. 804
A . M artinez v. Ryan ................................................ 804
B. Chaidez v. United States .......................................... 810
C. Florida's Postconviction Pipeline ................................... 812
IV. THE CASE FOR A POSTCONVICTION PIPELINE .............................. 814
A. The Logic of Griffith ............................................. 815
B. Finality and Comity .............................................. 818
C. Stunted Evolution of Norms ........................................ 819
V . CONCLUSION ... ........................................................ 824
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth
Amendment requires defense attorneys to counsel their noncitizen cli-
ents about the immigration consequences of a plea.2 Padilla had pled
guilty in state court to a drug crime. After his conviction became final,
he filed a state postconviction motion alleging that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise him that his plea
would trigger deportation. In holding that Padilla was entitled to compe-
tent advice regarding the consequences of his plea, the Court recognized
what professional norms have required for at least the last two decades.
Padilla left undecided the critical question of whether its holding
applies to other noncitizen defendants whose pleas were final before
March 31, 2010, when the Court issued its opinion. The Court took up
this question in Chaidez v. United States, a case raising this issue in the
context of a writ of coram nobis under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) involving a
federal conviction.4 Assuming, but not deciding, that the retroactivity
1. Rebecca Sharpless is Associate Clinical Professor at the University of Miami School of
Law. Andrew Stanton is an Assistant Public Defender in the Office of the Public Defender for the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, where he works in the appellate division. Sections of this
article first appeared in materials prepared for the annual conference of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association, South Florida Chapter.
2. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486-87 (2010).
3. See id. at 1482 (citing to numerous sources of professional norms "support[ing] the view
that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation," including materials from the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the American Bar Association).
4. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106 (2013).
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framework set out in Teague v. Lane applied to a federal conviction,5 the
Court held that Padilla established a "new rule" and, therefore, was not
available in postconviction proceedings involving pleas that became
final before Padilla.
In so ruling, the Court held for the first time that an application of
the ineffective assistance of counsel standard in Strickland v. Washing-
ton resulted in a new rule.7 Under Strickland, the "proper measure of
attorney performance" is "reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms."8 The Court held in Chaidez, however, that Padilla did not sim-
ply involve application of the Strickland standard.9 According to the
Court, Padilla had first answered the "threshold" question of whether
the scope of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of competent criminal
defense counsel encompasses the duty to warn about the risk of
deportation.' 0
In deciding that Padilla established a new rule, the Court expressly
declined to consider Chaidez's additional arguments that (1) Teague's
retroactivity framework does not apply when a federal, as opposed to a
state, conviction is at issue; and (2) new rules about ineffective assis-
tance of counsel should apply to postconviction proceedings in which
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised for the first time."I
This article focuses on Chaidez's last argument regarding the appli-
cation of certain types of new rules in postconviction proceedings, not-
withstanding Teague. This argument relies upon the Court's 2012
decision in Martinez v. Ryan, a federal habeas case involving review of a
state criminal conviction on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.1
2
The Court in Martinez recognized that, where a collateral proceeding is
the defendant's first opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assis-
tance, "the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a
prisoner's direct appeal as to the ineffectiveness-assistance claim."' 3 As
explained below, it is well established that new rules apply on direct
appeal. Chaidez's argument that Padilla's new rule should apply in post-
conviction proceedings as if she were on direct appeal relied on Marti-
nez's recognition of the functional equivalence of postconviction
5. See id. at 1105 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
6. See id. at 1107-11 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
7. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
8. Id.
9. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 1113 n.16.
12. See Brief for Petitioner at 30-31, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No.
11-820), 2012 WL 2948891, at *30-31 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012)). The
federal habeas provision that governs review of state convictions is 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
13. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.
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proceedings and a direct appeal in the context of initial ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims.
14
Chaidez's argument has implications not just for convictions under
federal postconviction review but for convictions under state collateral
review. The Florida Supreme Court has considered whether there are
circumstances in which Padilla governs postconviction challenges
involving pleas that became final before Padilla, even though Padilla
established a new rule. 5 Months before the Supreme Court's ruling in
Chaidez, the Florida Supreme Court decided three postconviction cases
involving state convictions that were final before Padilla.6 In these
cases-Hernandez v. State, Diaz v. State, and Castaro v. State-the
court anticipated the United States Supreme Court's Chaidez opinion,
holding that the "new rule" established by Padilla was not "retroac-
tive."' 7 The court, however, carved out an exception to find in favor of
the third petitioner, Castaflo, holding that she was eligible for relief
because she was already in the postconviction "pipeline" despite her
conviction having become final before Padilla was decided.' 8 While the
majority gave virtually no reasoning for its decision, a concurrence writ-
ten by Justice Pariente and joined by two other justices roughly tracked
the rationale of Chaidez's last argument about initial-review collateral
proceedings. 9
This article argues for a "postconviction pipeline" based in part on
the reasoning behind Justice Pariente's Castaflo concurrence and
Chaidez's argument relying on Martinez. The proposed pipeline
includes any properly filed postconviction motion in state or federal
court which involves an initial challenge to a criminal conviction. For
the constitutional and prudential reasons discussed below, new procedu-
ral constitutional rules must govern in these "initial-review collateral
proceedings," even if Teague would normally dictate otherwise.2°
14. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 30-31.
15. See generally Castaflo v. State, No. SCI 1-1571, 2012 WL 5869668 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012)
(per curiam); Diaz v. State, No. SCI 1-1281, 2012 WL 5869664 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) (per curiam);
Hernandez v. State, Nos. SCIl-941, SCI 1-1357, 2012 WL 5869660 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) (per
curiam).
16. See Castafio, 2012 WL 5869668; Diaz, 2012 WL 5869664; Hernandez, 2012 WL
5869660. The postconviction motions were filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850
(2012).
17. See Castaflo, 2012 WL 5869668; Diaz, 2012 WL 5869664; Hernandez, 2012 WL
5869660. Another state court came to the opposite conclusion, holding that Padilla did not
announce a new rule but only applied the old rule of Strickland. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460
Mass. 30, 949 N.E.2d 892 (2011).
18. Castaflo, 2012 WL 5869668, at *3 (Pariente, J., concurring).
19. See id.
20. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
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I. RETROACTIVITY
In the 1965 decision Linkletter v. Walker, the U.S. Supreme Court
announced principles for determining whether a new rule-there Mapp
v. Ohio's extension of the exclusionary rule to the states-should be
available to state prisoners in federal habeas proceedings whose convic-
tions were already final on direct appeal.21 Stating that the Constitution
was indifferent to whether a decision applied retroactively, the Court
adopted a "practical approach," holding that the retroactive effect of
each new rule should be determined on a case-by-case basis by "looking
to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. '22 It
held that Linkletter could not rely on Mapp to seek habeas relief from a
conviction that was affirmed more than a year before Mapp was
decided.23 After Linkletter, the Court went on to refuse to apply new
decisions to "convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.
'24
The Court could make some decisions prospective only, granting relief
to the litigants in the case that announced the rule and to no one else.
Although the Court recognized the "[i]nequity" of "according the benefit
of a new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not
to other litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who
have raised the same issue," the Court considered this disparate treat-
ment "an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of deci-
sion-making. 25
The Court retooled its retroactivity jurisprudence in the 1980s,
largely embracing the framework proposed earlier by Justice Harlan in a
number of dissenting and concurring opinions. 6 In Griffith v. Kentucky,
21. Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 642 (1961). For a
history of the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence, see Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen
Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the
Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court's Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REv. 161 (2005); see also
Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or "Redressability," after Danforth v.
Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of
Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRiu. L. REv. 1 n.17 (2009)
(collecting sources); Randy Hertz & James Liebman, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 25.2 (6th ed. 2011).
22. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
23. Id. at 640.
24. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967); see also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
719 (1966) (refusing to apply a decision to a case on direct appeal).
25. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301 (citations omitted).
26. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Supreme Court later characterized the term "retroactivity" as misleading because it suggests a
"judicial power to create new rules of law." Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
But, the Court has explained, a "newly announced right" exists prior to its announcement. Id.
When the Court determines retroactivity of a new rule, it assesses not "temporal scope[,]" but
[Vol. 67:795
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the Court held that new rules must apply to all cases not yet final on
direct appeal. 27 The Court found that "failure to apply a newly declared
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates
basic norms of constitutional adjudication. '28 The Constitution forbids
the Court from "legislat[ing]" new rules and limits its power to announc-
ing them in the context of a case or controversy.29 The Court endorsed
Justice Harlan's views that (1) "to disregard current law in adjudicating
cases before us that have not already run the full course of appellate
review" is to legislate rather than adjudicate;30 and (2) the "selective
application of new rules" would fail to treat "similarly situated defend-
ants the same."'" Fairness thus prevented the Court from "'[s]imply
fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehi-
cle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a
stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new
rule.' "132
Turning to the application of new decisions to convictions already
final on direct appeal, the Court next replaced Linkletter with the test
announced in Teague v. Lane.33 Teague was before the Court on a fed-
"whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will
entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought." Id. The term "redressability," the Court has
suggested, may be more accurate. Id. at 271 n.5.
27. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987). A pending case is one for which the
time to petition for certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet expired. See Beard v.
Banks, 548 U.S. 406, 411 (2006). The Griffith rule thus applies to cases in which a notice of
appeal has not yet been filed, cases pending after a notice has been filed, and cases denied on
appeal where the time to file for certiorari or rehearing has not yet expired. Courts sometimes refer
to such a case as a "pipeline" case or a case still in the direct-appeal pipeline. See, e.g., United
States v. Fernandez, 397 F. App'x 433, 443-44 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rodriguez, 406
F.3d 1261, 1298 (11 th Cir. 2005) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); United
States v. Brown, 444 F.3d 519, 520 (6th Cir. 2006).
28. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (internal
quotations omitted).
31. Id. (citing Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also id. ("[T]he
problem with not applying new rules to cases pending on direct review is 'the actual inequity that
results when the Court chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance
beneficiary' of a new rule.") (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 539, 556, n.16 (1982)
(emphasis in original)).
32. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
33. See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-311 (1989). This part of Teague was
adopted by only four justices. See id. at 291. A majority of the Court subsequently acceded to it,
however. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Justice O'Connor's opinion in Teague essentially
adopted the test for retroactivity put forth by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("we now adopt Justice Harlan's view of
retroactivity for cases on collateral review").
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eral habeas challenge to a state conviction.34 He argued that the Court
should extend the Sixth-Amendment's fair cross-section requirement to
a petit jury.35 The Court held that the requested extension would be a
new rule because "the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final" and that the new rule
could not apply in Teague's federal habeas proceedings.36 Looking to
the purpose of federal habeas review of state convictions and the "inter-
ests of comity and finality," the Court held that "[u]nless they fall within
an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final
before the new rules are announced. '37 Rejecting its prior approach, the
Court found that, if a new rule were announced in a case, "evenhanded
justice [would require] that it be applied retroactively to all who are
similarly situated."
38
Thus, under Teague, the extent of a rule's application depends on
whether it is an "old rule" or a "new rule."3 9 An old rule rasies no retro-
activity concerns and, therefore, applies to all criminal cases and can be
raised in postconviction proceedings.4" New rules, in contrast, are not
retroactive unless they fall into two narrow exceptions.4'
34. Teague was decided before the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
amended the federal habeas statute to impose a relitigation bar. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (a
federal court cannot overturn a state conviction based on a claim "that was adjudicated on the
merits" in state proceedings unless the state decision "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States"). For a discussion of how AEDPA's relitigation bar relates to Teague, see
infra Part IV.C.
35. Teague, 489 U.S. at 292.
36. Id. at 301 (citation and emphasis omitted).
37. Id. at 308-10.
38. Id. at 300.
39. A new rule includes a rule that a litigant is seeking to establish in his or her case as well
as a rule that a litigant is seeking to rely upon that was announced in another case (after the
litigant's conviction had already become final). Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
40. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) ("Under the Teague framework, an
old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to
cases that are still on direct review.").
41. "Substantive" new rules-rules that decriminalize conduct or alter punishment-are
retroactive. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 ("Substantive" rules are those that put conduct or punishment
"beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.") (internal citations
omitted). New procedural rules, however, are only retroactive if they are "watershed," such that
they undermine the accuracy of the criminal proceeding and "implicate the fundamental fairness
of the trial." Id. at 311-12. The only new procedural rule that has ever been recognized as such a
"watershed" rule is Gideon v. Wainwright's holding that criminal defendants facing a deprivation
of liberty have a right to appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1963).
Although Teague was decided after Gideon, the Court has recognized post-Teague that Gideon
was a watershed procedural rule. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419. The Court has gone so far as to
say that it is unlikely that it will ever announce another "watershed" new rule that would qualify
for Teague's second exception. Id. at 418 (citation omitted).
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State courts reviewing state convictions may give broader effect to
new rules than what is required under Teague.42 In Danforth v. Minne-
sota, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states are not bound by the
Supremacy Clause to adopt the Teague test for retroactivity.43 Central to
the Court's decision was the observation that Teague involved a state
conviction on review in federal habeas.' Such federal review of state
convictions implicates "[f]ederalism and comity considerations," includ-
ing "respect for the finality of state convictions."45 The Court reasoned
that states could decide for themselves whether to give greater retroac-
tive effect to new rules because the "finality of state convictions is a
state interest, not a federal one."46 As such, the comity rationale under-
lying Teague does not apply when states review convictions in their own
system of collateral review. The Court observed that "[i]f anything, con-
siderations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant
habeas relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by
Teague."47
As a result, some states have not adopted Teague's retroactivity
analysis for new rules, but instead use their own.48 For example, Florida
uses a standard that "provides more expansive retroactivity standards
than those adopted in Teague."49 Teague may remain relevant as setting
42. Maryland, for example, ruled prior to Chaidez that Padilla is retroactive based on state
principles that sweep more broadly than Teague. Denisyuk v. Maryland, 30 A.3d 914 (Md. 2011).
43. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 289 (2008). Danforth was convicted after trial in
Minnesota court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser was violated.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected Danforth's claim based on the U.S. Supreme
Court's rule in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Danforth's conviction became final in 1998
when the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review. Then, in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned Ohio to decide in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), that defendants have a
right to confront their accusers. Danforth initiated federal habeas proceedings, arguing that his
conviction was obtained in violation of Crawford. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled against
him, holding that Crawford was a nonretroactive new rule and that states could not give broader
retroactive effect to new rules than what was required under Teague. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court.
44. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 278-79. Danforth expressly did not address whether Teague applies
to review of federal convictions in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings. Id. at 269 n.4 ("this case does
not present the question[ ] ... whether the Teague rule applies to cases brought under 28 U.S.C.
2255 (2000 ed. and Supp. V)."
45. Id. at 279.
46. Id. at 280.
47. Id. at 279-80.
48. The majority of states, however, have adopted Teague notwithstanding the fact that
Teague was based on comity concerns that are not present when state courts review state
convictions. See Lasch, supra note 21, at 42 n.306 (noting that thirty-seven states apply Teague).
Compelling arguments exist for states to opt not to follow Teague and to give broader effect to
new rules. See generally id.; see also Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of
Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REv. 421 (1993).
49. Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 409 (Ha. 2005) (per curiam); see also Witt v. State, 387
So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam); The Horida Witt test is based on the pre-Teague test for
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a floor regarding retroactivity. In Danforth, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that "the remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for
violation of the Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law"
but that federal law "'sets certain minimum requirements that States
must meet but may exceed in providing appropriate relief."50 Under
this view, a state's analysis of whether a rule is "new" or "old" and
whether a new rule applies in postconviction proceedings must be at
least as generous to defendants as Teague.
II. TEAGUE'S THRESHOLD QUESTION
The Court found in Teague that there would be "harm" if it were to
announce a new rule on collateral review to benefit one petitioner while
not giving the benefit of the new rule to others whose appeals were
final.5" The Court dealt with this inequity by mandating that federal
courts ask a "threshold question" regarding "whether the court is obli-
gated to apply the Teague rule to the defendant's claim.""2 If a rule is
new and falls outside the limited exceptions for retroactivity, the court
cannot reach the merits of the case.53 Before reviewing a state convic-
retroactivity set out in Linkletter. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Other states have also
adopted tests based on Linkletter. See, e.g., State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1140 n.81 (Alaska
2009); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W. 3d 253, 268 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
50. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 288 (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'n, v. Smith 496 U.S. 167, 178-79
(1990) (plurality opinion)). However, in a footnote earlier in the opinion, the Court noted that it
was an open question "whether States are required to apply [Teague] 'watershed' rules in state
post-conviction proceedings." Id. at 269 n. 4. In a dissent, Justice Roberts disputed the majority's
conclusion that states would be bound by a U.S. Supreme Court decision finding a rule
retroactive, arguing that there was no "basis" for the "majority's logic for concluding that States
are free to hold our decisions retroactive when we have held they are not, but not free to hold that
they are not when we have held they are." Id. at 309-10 (Roberts, J., dissenting). In a case
decided in the year before Teague, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that South Carolina was bound
to accept the Court's determination regarding whether a case announced a new rule or not. Yates
v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1988).
51. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989) (quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432
U.S. 233, 247 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (internal quote omitted)) ("But the harm caused by
the failure to treat similarly situated defendants alike cannot be exaggerated: such inequitable
treatment 'hardly comports with the ideal of administration of justice with an even hand.' ").
52. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994).
53. See, e.g., Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999) (per curiam) (refusing to consider
merits of petitioner's claim because a favorable ruling would "create and apply a new procedural
rule in violation of Teague v. Lane"). Because the Teague threshold test prevents courts from
reaching the merits of claims, it, unlike Linkletter, thwarts the development of constitutional new
rules in the criminal procedural context. According to a leading treatise on federal habeas corpus
proceedings, "[tihere is considerable consensus among commentators... that Teague's 'threshold
question' rule is misguided." Hertz & Liebman, supra note 21, at § 25.4 (citing articles, arguing
that the threshold question was not a holding in Teague's plurality opinion, and giving eight
reasons why the merits should be decided before the new/old rule question); see also Susan
Bandes, Taking Justice To Its Logical Extreme: A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 2453, 2455 (1993) (Teague purports to "remedy the unfair results of former retroactivity
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tion on federal habeas, a court must first ask whether disposition of the
case would require announcing a nonretroactive new rule.54 Teague's
approach to dealing with the harm of not treating similarly situated liti-
gants alike is thus to inflict harm on all postconviction litigants by mak-
ing virtually all new rules inapplicable to their cases.
If a state waives the Teague defense, a federal court "may, but need
not, decline to apply Teague."55 However, if a state asserts Teague, a
"court must apply Teague before considering the merits of the claim."56
Moreover, a federal court must decide the threshold question even if
prior courts had not, as long as the government has properly raised the
issue.57 Thus federal courts reviewing state convictions on federal
rules" but "merely succeeds in creating a new arbitrary category of remediless prisoners: those
whose cases happen to be on collateral, rather than direct, review at the auspicious moment when
the Court hands down a decision classified as 'new law' "); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731,
1742 (1991) (characterizing the threshold test as "threshold uncertainty" that results in
unpredictability); Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity
Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25
Am. J. CRIM. L. 203, 287 (1998) (criticizing the lack of guidance regarding what constitutes a new
rule as "leaving federal courts a zone of discretion with which they can make outcome
determinative decisions without necessarily reaching the merits of the claims").
54. It is often difficult to discern whether a rule is new or old. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson,
262 F.3d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002) ("Even in Teague,
the plurality opinion acknowledged that the task of determining whether a case announces a new
rule is often difficult."). Teague reversed the prior rule of deciding the merits first. See Am.
Trucking Ass'n, 496 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion) (citing Consol. Foods Corp. v. Unger, 456
U.S. 1002, 1003 (1982) ("we have generally considered the question of retroactivity to be a
separate problem [from the merits], one that need not be resolved in the law-changing decision
itself').
55. Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389. Because retroactivity is not constitutional or statutory, it is not
jurisdictional. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1990); see also Linkletter, 381
U.S. at 629 (the "Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retroactive effect"); Hopkins v.
Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 94 n.3 (1998) (refusing to decide Teague issue and proceeding to the merits
because the state had raised the Teague issue for the first time on its petition for certiorari).
56. Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389 (emphasis in original); see also Collins, 497 U.S. at 41; Schiro
v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1994).
57. Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 267 (2002) (per curiam); Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389. In Horn,
Banks, the defendant, was convicted under Pennsylvania law for first-degree murder and had been
sentenced to death. 536 U.S. at 268. After exhausting a direct appeal, the defendant filed a state
postconviction motion relying on Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), and McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), which struck down capital sentencing rules that required juries to
disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously. Id. at 268-69, 271; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Horn, 536 U.S. 266 (No. 01-1385). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached the
merits of Banks' ineffectiveness claim without first deciding whether Mills was retroactive and
ruled against him. Horn, 536 U.S. at 267. Banks then pursued federal postconviction proceedings.
Id. at 268. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that it did not have to rule on the
retroactivity of the Mills rule because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not addressed it. Id. at
267. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that "federal courts must address the Teague
question when it is properly argued by the government." Id. (citing Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389). On
remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals graited Banks' habeas petition. Banks v. Horn, 316 F.3d 228,
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habeas must first decide the Teague question-whether a case involves
application of a new or old rule-before proceeding to the merits of a
case brought in collateral proceedings. In a case found to involve a non-
retroactive new rule, a court must decline to reach the merits.58
The rule mandating that the new/old rule question be decided
before the merits applies in federal habeas review of state convictions
because this was the procedural posture in Teague. Most states, how-
ever, have adopted Teague's threshold question test when evaluating
convictions in state collateral proceedings.59 As discussed above, states
have the power to fashion rules for retroactivity that are at least as gen-
erous to litigants as Teague.6" In cases on certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court directly from state court, states have argued that, as a matter of
state law, the old/new rule question be decided before the merits of the
case.
61
Ill. INITIAL-REVIEW COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Martinez v. Ryan
In the federal system, ineffective-assistance challenges are often
brought in postconviction proceedings and not on direct appeal.62 Many
states similarly require that ineffective-assistance claims be brought in
collateral proceedings or have created systems that encourage channel-
ing of claims into such proceedings. 63 The U.S. Supreme Court has
grappled with how to ensure that litigants can access the court system to
247 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision, holding under Teague
that Mills established a new, nonretroactive rule. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 410, 416 (2004).
58. In a federal habeas case governed by AEDPA, a court must also decide whether resolution
of the case involves only "clearly established law" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). See
discussion infra Part IV.
59. See supra note 48.
60. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Mallett v. Missouri, 494 U.S. 1009, 1011-12 (1990) (raising Teague threshold
issue as a defense in an opposition to a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court).
As discussed infra Part IV.C., Kentucky could have asserted the Teague issue in Padilla but did
not. Even if the comity rationale underlying the Teague rule applies in cases involving review of
state collateral proceedings on certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, that same rationale would not
apply to state courts' review of state convictions. See discussion supra Part I. There are
compelling reasons why states should not adopt Teague's threshold question test. See supra note
48. Similar arguments support the view that federal courts need not follow Teague when
reviewing federal, as opposed to state, convictions.
62. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).
63. See, e.g., Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1915 ("The structure and design of the Texas system [for
IAC claims] in actual operation, however, make it 'virtually impossible' for an ineffective
assistance claim to be presented on direct review.") (quoting Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808,
810-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 808-09 (2006)
(ineffective assistance of counsel claim is "not one that an appellate court could have resolved on
direct appeal in the first instance" and therefore was appropriately raised in postconviction).
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raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims, given that these claims are
typically brought in postconviction proceedings. In Martinez v. Ryan,
the Court concluded that when postconviction proceedings are a defen-
dant's first opportunity to raise the issue of ineffectiveness of trial coun-
sel, collateral review may become the functional equivalent of a direct
appeal. 64
Martinez argued that he had a constitutional right to counsel to
assist him in raising his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAG) claim.65
The right to counsel at trial and on a first appeal as of right is well
established.66 But the U.S. Supreme Court has broadly refused to extend
this right to discretionary and collateral proceedings. In Ross v. Moffitt,
the Court held that there was no constitutional right to counsel in discre-
tionary appeals beyond the first appeal as of right or in petitioning for
certiorari in the Supreme Court.6 7 The Court later held in Pennsylvania
v. Finley68 and Murray v. Giarratano that there is no constitutional right
to counsel in state postconviction proceedings.69 In both Moffitt and Fin-
ley, the Court reasoned that the defendant had not been denied meaning-
ful access to the courts because he had the benefit of the briefs, record,
and opinion from the direct appeal.7°
More recently, however, the Court has recognized a right to counsel
outside the context of a direct appeal as of right. In Halbert v. Michigan,
the Court held that the defendant had a due process right to counsel for a
petition for a discretionary appeal where it was the defendant's first
opportunity to appeal from his conviction. 71 Halbert involved Michi-
gan's system of treating appeals from pleas of guilty or nolo contendere
64. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).
65. See Brief for Petitioner at 16-21, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 10-1001). For an
argument that effective counsel on postconviction is required under an access to court rationale,
see Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA
Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219 (2012).
66. In federal prosecutions, the right to counsel at trial and on appeal is guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, as is the right to trial counsel in state prosecutions. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462-63 (1938); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 565 (1957); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (Sixth Amendment incorporated by Fourteenth Amendment). The right
to appellate counsel on first appeal as of right in state cases is independently sourced in the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1985).
67. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 614-15 (1974) (finding that Moffitt's claims had already
"once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court.") (quoting Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963)).
68. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
69. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1989).
70. See Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 615; Finley, 481 U.S. at 557.
71. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 623-24 (2005).
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differently from other appeals in criminal cases.72 Normally, a Michigan
defendant would have the automatic right to a direct appeal from a con-
viction and therefore the right to counsel under Douglas.7 3 But if that
defendant pled guilty or nolo contendere, she could appeal only by leave
of the court, and some judges declined to appoint counsel for this discre-
tionary appeal.74 Relying on Moffitt, Michigan's Supreme Court
approved this practice. 75 The Supreme Court reversed, observing that a
Michigan court's ruling on an application for leave to appeal provided
"the first, and likely the only, direct review the defendant's conviction
and sentence will receive."76 The Supreme Court distinguished this
"first-tier appeal" from the "second-tier" review at issue in Moffitt.
Unlike an appellant seeking second-tier discretionary review, "[a] first-
tier review applicant, forced to act pro se, will face a record unreviewed
by appellate counsel, and will be equipped with no attorney's brief pre-
pared for, or reasoned opinion by, a court of review. 77
Martinez involved a possible exception to Finley and Giarratano
for first-tier review of IAC claims that the Court had left open in Cole-
man v. Thompson.78 Coleman involved federal habeas review of a Vir-
ginia conviction. Several claims, including an IAC claim, were first
raised in state habeas proceedings rather than on direct appeal. Nor-
mally, a state defendant must present an issue on direct appeal in state
court before raising it in collateral proceedings.79 Virginia, however,
required that IAC claims relating to trial counsel be brought initially in
state habeas rather than on direct appeal.8" A Virginia trial court held an
evidentiary hearing and dismissed Coleman's IAC claim. Coleman
appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, but his attorney filed the notice
of appeal three days late. The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal as untimely and the federal district court in turn dismissed Cole-
man's federal habeas petition as procedurally defaulted, finding that
independent and adequate state grounds existed for the state court's
decision. Coleman sought to excuse the default because his postconvic-
tion attorney had been ineffective by filing an untimely notice of
72. Id. at 612.
73. See id. at 609-10, 612 (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963); People v.
Bulger, 614 N.W.2d 103, 106-07 (Mich. 2000)).
74. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 609.
75. See id. at 609; see also Bulger, 614 N.W.2d at 112 (Mich. 2000); People v. Harris, 681
N.W.2d 653, 653 (Mich. 2004).
76. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 619.
77. Id.
78. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991).
79. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986).
80. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755.
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appeal.81 Ineffectiveness of counsel can excuse a procedural default, but
only when the Constitution guarantees effective counsel in the first
place.82 Coleman argued that the Fourteenth Amendment mandated an
exception to the rule of Finley and Giarratano "in those cases where
state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge
to his conviction."83 His argument that a defendant has the right to coun-
sel to raise IAC claims on postconviction rests on the observation that
such a proceeding is the equivalent of direct appeal because it is the first
opportunity to present an IAC claim.84 But Coleman went one step fur-
ther, arguing that he was entitled to effective counsel to appeal the
denial of his IAC claim. The U.S. Supreme Court treated this as an argu-
ment for a right to counsel on second-tier review, a situation more akin
to Moffitt.85 The Court determined that it did not have to reach Cole-
man's claim regarding a right to counsel in his collateral proceedings
because he was in fact able to receive first-tier review of his IAC claim
in state habeas proceedings with the assistance of counsel.86
Martinez presented the constitutional question left open in Cole-
man: "whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral
proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance at trial."87 Martinez was a federal habeas petitioner with
an Arizona conviction who argued ineffective assistance of counsel.88
Arizona law barred him from raising this claim on direct review. His
first opportunity was in state postconviction proceedings.89 Martinez's
postconviction counsel had not raised the ineffectiveness claim because
she believed that Martinez had "no meritorious claims."9 The failure to
present the IAC claim in the initial state postconviction petition consti-
81. Id. at 752.
82. See id.; see id. at 754-55.
83. Id. at 755.
84. Id. at 756.
85. See id. at 756-57.
86. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 756 ("Coleman has had his 'one and only appeal,' if that is
what a state collateral proceeding may be considered; the Buchanan County Circuit Court, after a
2-day evidentiary hearing, addressed Coleman's claims of trial error, including his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.").
87. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1315; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i,
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (No. 10-101001), 2011 WL 398287, at i (question
presented: "Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from
raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law
right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal constitutional right to
effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.").
88. Martinez 132 S. Ct. at 1314-15.
89. See id. at 1316.
90. Id. at 1313.
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tuted procedural default foreclosing federal review. 91 Martinez's new
attorney argued that the procedural default should be excused because
Martinez had a Fourteenth Amendment right to effective state postcon-
viction counsel and that this right had been violated when postconvic-
tion counsel failed to raise the trial IAC issue.92 Martinez argued that he
was entitled to effective counsel in collateral proceedings because it was
the first opportunity to raise his IAC claim.93 The Court referred to such
collateral proceedings as "initial-review collateral proceedings." 94
Having been presented with the constitutional question left open by
Coleman, the Court again declined to answer it. Rather than rely on a
constitutional right to counsel, the Court ruled on the basis of its discre-
tionary authority over the equitable rules of procedural default.95 The
Court nevertheless relied on the fact that state postconviction proceed-
ings are normally the first-tier review of IAC claims. 96 As in Halbert,
the Court found that a pro se defendant would not have the benefit of an
attorney's brief or court's opinion addressing his IAC claims. 97 The
Court characterized "the collateral proceeding" as "in many ways the
equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance
claim."98 As an equitable matter, the Court found that the procedural
default for failing to raise an IAC claim in state court could be excused
if the state did not provide postconviction counsel or if postconviction
counsel was ineffective.
Martinez recognized the equivalence of direct appeal and initial-
review collateral proceedings when analyzing whether a procedural
default should apply. The Court stated its holding as: "[w]here, under
state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised
91. See id. Commentators have criticized procedural default rules. See Daniel J. Meltzer,
State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1128, 1234-36 (1986) (arguing that
a "procedural default" is typically a consequence of a "breakdown in the adversary process" such
that the prosecution rather than the defense should bear the costs of forfeiture); Andrew Hammel,
Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty
Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 2, 82 (2002) (procedural default rules deprive death
penalty defendants from any "meaningful" postconviction review).
92. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314-15.
93. Id. at 1315. See also Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Has Endangered Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus and What the Supreme Court Can
Do in Maples and Martinez to Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 213 (2011) (arguing that the
U.S. Supreme Court should "extend the right to counsel to first state post-conviction
proceedings"); Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings,
58 Md. L. Rev. 1393 (1999), (arguing for a constitutional right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings).
94. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314-15.
95. Id. at 1318.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 1317.
98. Id.
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in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not
bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective
assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was
no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective."99 The Court
made a "narrow exception" to the rule in Coleman for situations in
which a petitioner is required to defer IAC claims to postconviction.1t°
Subsequently, however, in Trevino v. Thaler the Court applied the Mar-
tinez exception in a Texas case in which the IAC claim could theoreti-
cally have been brought on direct appeal but the opportunity was not
"meaningful."101
Martinez involved Arizona law, which flatly prohibits defendants
from raising IAC on direct appeal.102 An Arizona defendant's sole
forum for presenting such a claim is in postconviction. 10 3 In contrast,
Texas does not absolutely bar TAC claims from being brought on direct
appeal. 0 4 Trevino had been sentenced to death. Texas has a dual-track
review system for capital cases.10 5 When a defendant is sentenced to
death and appeals, the court appoints counsel to simultaneously pursue
postconviction claims, including IAC.'06 Litigants are highly discour-
aged from pursuing IAC claims on direct appeal.' 07 Nevertheless, Texas
argued that Trevino could have attempted to raise IAC issues in the
direct appeal by filing a motion for new trial within thirty days of sen-
tencing.1 08 Because the bar on raising IAC claims on direct appeal is not
absolute, Texas argued, Martinez should not excuse a Texas defendant's
procedural default.' 0 9 In an amicus brief, the Attorneys General of half
99. Id. at 1320 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 1311.
101. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013).
102. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314 (citing State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002)).
103. Id. at 1313.
104. Brief for the Respondent at 21-23, Trevino, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (No. 11-10189).
105. Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F. App'x 415, 426 (5th Cir. 2011).
106. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071 § 3(a) (2011).
107. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated: "As a general rule, one should not raise
an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal." Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430
n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (Baird, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original). The court further explained, "This is so
because a trial record is generally insufficient to address claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in light of the 'strong presumption that (trial) counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance."' Id.
108. Brief for the Respondent at 31-32, Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (No. 11-
10189) (citing, inter alia, Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
109. Curiously, Texas conceded that "if direct-appeal counsel fails [to raise an IAC claim], the
federal habeas court will be able to consider the claim because the unconstitutional ineffectiveness
of counsel on direct appeal will serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of the
ineffectiveness claim." Id. at 24-25. The Court responded to this argument by observing that
Texas could "point[ ] to no case in which such a failure by appellate counsel has been deemed
constitutionally ineffective." Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1920. The Court noted that the "lack of
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the States (including Florida) supported Texas' position, asserting that
Martinez should not apply to the "vast majority" of states."' 0
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Trevino, finding that the
"structure, design, and operation" of the Texan system "does not offer
most defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal."'' The Court character-
ized the difference between the Arizona and Texas procedural schemes
as "a distinction without a difference." ' 1 2 Without the Martinez excep-
tion, the Court found that "the Texas procedural system would create
significant unfairness" because "Texas courts in effect have directed
defendants to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on
collateral, rather than on direct, review.""' 3 Initial-review collateral pro-
ceedings and direct appeals can thus be functionally equivalent, even if
there is some chance that a claim could have been brought on direct
appeal.
B. Chaidez v. United States
It is against this backdrop that Roselva Chaidez argued to the U.S.
Supreme Court that Padilla involved the application of the old rule of
Strickland v. Washington and that, if Padilla established a new rule, the
rule should apply in "initial-review collateral proceeding" cases like
hers." 4 Chaidez had pled guilty to the federal crime of mail fraud after
her defense attorney allegedly failed to advise her that immigration law
categorizes the offense as an aggravated felony that triggers deporta-
tion." 5 Before the Supreme Court decided Padilla, Chaidez petitioned
for a writ of coram nobis in U.S. district court to set aside her conviction
because of her lawyer's deficient performance." 16 Because there is no
deadline for filing a writ of coram nobis in federal court, and because
she filed within a reasonable period of time, her petition was found to be
timely.' 17 After Padilla was decided, she sought to rely upon it to argue
authority is not surprising given the fact that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has directed
defendants to bring such claims on collateral review." Id.
110. Brief of Amici Curiae Utah and 24 Other States in Support of Respondent, Trevino v.
Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (No. 11-10189).
111. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114, Brief for Petitioner at 30 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No. 11-820)
(quoting Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012)).
115. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106 (2013).
116. See id.
117. The U.S. district court rejected the government's laches argument. See U.S. v. Chaidez,
No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (finding that a seven month
delay in filing a writ for coram nobis was "reasonably diligent"), overruled on other grounds by
133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106 (2013).
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that her attorney had breached his Sixth Amendment duty to advise her
about deportation." 8
Because Chaidez's ineffective assistance claim-like the great
majority of such claims-arose in the context of a postconviction pro-
ceeding rather than a direct appeal, the issue was whether Padilla
applied to her case. 119 Chaidez argued to the district court and court of
appeals that Padilla did not establish a new rule but merely applied
Strickland v. Washington's old rule governing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.1 21 In a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc
before the court of appeals, Chaidez further argued that Teague's retro-
activity framework did not apply to her case because Teague involved a
state conviction on federal habeas review, a context that raised comity
concerns that are not present when a federal court reviews a federal con-
viction.121 Relying on Martinez, she also argued in briefing to the U.S.
Supreme Court that any new rule must apply to new or pending postcon-
viction claims like hers that initially raise ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims. 
122
The Court rejected Chaidez's first argument, ruling that Padilla
established a new rule under the framework of Teague.I2 3 As mentioned
above, this was the first time that the Court had held that an application
of Strickland created a new rule. The Court declined, however, to rule
on Chaidez's other claims, stating in a footnote that they had not been
properly preserved. 24 Chaidez thus left open the questions whether (1)
118. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1111 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("The proper
measure of attorney performance [is] simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.").
121. Compare Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106 (concerning a federal conviction of mail fraud),
with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (involving a state court conviction for three counts of
attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery); see also
Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1113 n. 16.
122. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12.
123. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1111.
124. See id. at 1113 n.16. The Court stated:
Chaldez makes two back-up arguments in her merits briefs-that Teague's bar on
retroactivity does not apply when a petitioner challenges a federal conviction, or at
least does not do so when she makes a claim of ineffective assistance. Brief for
Petitioner 27-39. But Chaidez did not include those issues in her petition for
certiorari. Nor, still more critically, did she adequately raise them in the lower
courts. Only her petition for rehearing en banc in the Seventh Circuit at all
questioned Teague's applicability, and her argument there-that a "Teague-light"
standard should apply to challenges to federal convictions-differs from the ones
she has made in this Court. See Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc in
No. 10-3623(CA7), p. 13. Moreover, we cannot find any case in which a federal
court has considered Chaidez's contention that Teague should not apply to
ineffective assistance claims. "[M]indful that we are a court of review, not of first
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Teague's retroactivity framework applies to review of federal, as
opposed to state, convictions; and (2) whether Padilla is the governing
standard in postconviction cases involving pre-Padilla pleas raising ini-
tial ineffective assistance of counsel claims that could not have been
brought on direct appeal.
125
C. Florida's Postconviction Pipeline
The Florida Supreme Court has taken up the question of whether
Padilla's new rule applies to an initial-review collateral proceeding
involving ineffective assistance of counsel. The trio of cases-Her-
nandez, Diaz, and Castaflo-involved three noncitizens with Florida
convictions who filed for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.126 Each had a final criminal conviction
before Padilla was decided. Each alleged that their lawyers failed to
advise them that their pleas made them subject to "presumptively
mandatory deportation."'
' 27
Castafio, like Chaidez, filed for postconviction relief before
Padilla, and her case was still pending when the decision was rendered.
She filed her petition within two years of her conviction becoming final,
as required by Rule 3.850(b). 128 Hernandez and Diaz filed their motions
after Padilla and beyond the rule's two-year deadline. Although the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that Padilla "does not apply retroactively,"
the court made an important exception to this holding in Castaflo by
grandfathering certain "pipeline" postconviction claims. 1 9 The court
view," we decline to rule on Chaidez's new arguments. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 718 n. 7 (2005).
Id.
125. Thus, in Chaidez the Court for the first time applied Teague to a federal conviction,
without deciding whether Teague applies at all.
126. See Castaflo v. State, No. SCl1-1571, 2012 WL 5869668 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) (per
curiam); Diaz v. State, No. SCl1-1281, 2012 WL 5869664 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) (per curiam);
Hernandez v. State, Nos. SCll-941, SClI1-1357, 2012 WL 5869660 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) (per
curiam).
127. Hernandez, 2012 WL 5869660, at *3. When pleading guilty, each received some version
of the generic judicial warning under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8) that the plea
"may subject" him or her to deportation. Id. The Rule requires that the judge accepting the plea
warn each defendant-citizen and noncitizen alike-that "if he or she pleads guilty or nolo
contendere, if he or she is not a United States citizen, the plea may subject him or her to
deportation pursuant to the laws and regulations governing the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(8) (2012). The Florida Supreme Court ruled
that the generic judicial warning that deportation "may" result from a plea does not automatically
cure the prejudice of defense counsel's deficient performance when deportation was not just
possible but "presumptively mandatory." Hernandez, 2012 WL 5869660, at *4.
128. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b) (2012).
129. Castaflo, 2012 WL 5869668, at *1 (Pariente, J., concurring). In so doing, the Court
skipped over the threshold issue of whether Padilla constitutes a new or an old rule. The Court
assumed that Padilla had established a "new rule" and analyzed whether it was a retroactive new
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issued a per curiam decision holding that because Castafio's "postcon-
viction proceeding was pending when the United States Supreme Court
issued Padilla . . . Padilla does apply to Castafio's pending case."'
' 30
Justice Pariente, in an opinion in which Justices Quince and Perry con-
curred, explained the Court's conclusion. She noted that (1) Castaflo,
unlike Hernandez, had filed her petition in a timely manner; (2) Castafio
filed her petition before Padilla was decided; and (3) her petition was
still pending when Padilla was decided. 13t Recognizing the general prin-
ciple that new rules do not apply in postconviction proceedings, she
found that Padilla was different because it "created new law that would
apply to a claim raised in postconviction, not on direct appeal. ' 32 Her
reasoning on this last point tracked that of Chaidez's Martinez argument:
Because ineffective assistance of counsel claims are typically brought
for the first time in collateral proceedings (initial-review collateral pro-
ceedings), litigants should receive the benefit of new rules governing
these claims created in a postconviction context. Consistent with Grif-
fith's reasoning that "similarly situated defendants" must be treated "the
same,"'1 33 Justice Pariente further observed that it "would be inequitable
and illogical to hold that only one of two similarly situated defendants-
Padilla and not Castaflo-should receive the benefit of the United States
Supreme Court's decision."' 34
The Florida pipeline exception established in Castafio straightfor-
wardly includes any postconviction litigant who filed a timely motion
before Padilla and whose case was still pending. The scope of the post-
conviction pipeline is arguably broader, however. Anyone with a pre-
Padilla plea who files a timely motion (i.e., within two years of the
conviction becoming final) would appear to be covered, even if the
motion was filed after Padilla was decided. 135 No relevant distinction
exists between a timely motion filed before Padilla or after Padilla,
since both types of motions fall within the postconviction pipeline. As
discussed above, in the context of direct appeals, a litigant receives the
rule, holding that it was not. Id. (majority opinion). Chaidez later ruled that Padilla had
established a new rule.
130. Id. Castafho had filed a timely postconviction motion. If she had not, the Court would
likely have not ruled in her favor.
131. While Justice Pariente stressed the timelinesss of Castafio's motion and pointed out that
Hernandez had waited nine years to file his postconviction case, she did not at any point refer to
the two-year deadline under Rule 3.850. It is therefore not clear whether she was referring to
timeliness under the Rule or to the absence of a laches problem in Castaflo's case. See id.
(Pariente, J., concurring).
132. Id. at *3.
133. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).
134. Castafio, 2012 WL 5869668, at *3 (Pariente, J., concurring).
135. FLA. R. CRIM. PRo. 3.850(b).
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benefit of a new rule even if she files a (timely) appeal after the decision
creating the new rule.
13 6
While the Castaflo pipeline expressly excluded Hernandez, Justice
Pariente's concurrence does not satisfactorily explain why the "new
law" of Padilla would not also apply to Hemandez. If Padilla created a
new rule intended to apply in postconviction proceedings it should have
applied equally to Hernandez, who was also in postconviction proceed-
ings. It would have been more consistent with the decision to grant relief
to Castaflo for the Court to have held in Hernandez that Padilla estab-
lished a new rule which applies to postconviction claims involving con-
victions that were final before Padilla. The relevant contrast between
Castaflo and Hernandez lies in the timeliness of their petitions (rather
than in whether they were filed before or after Padilla). After finding
that Padilla is "new law" that governs in postconviction proceedings,
the Court could then have denied relief to Hernandez because his peti-
tion was untimely.1 37 Such reasoning would have squared with the
court's decision to grant relief to Castafio and not Hernandez.
IV. THE CASE FOR A POSTCONVICTION PIPELINE
The Castaflo line of reasoning that Padilla was "new law" intended
to apply in postconviction proceedings and Chaidez's argument based
on Martinez is correct. New rules relating to ineffective assistance
claims must govern in initial-review collateral proceedings for the same
constitutional reasons that the U.S. Supreme Court has said litigants
must have the benefit of new rules on direct appeal. As recognized by
the Court in Griffith, Article III mandates that new rules be announced
in the context of deciding the outcome of a case or controversy.' 38 Once
announced, new rules must apply to all pending cases because the "fail-
ure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pend-
ing on direct review [would] violate[ ] basic norms of constitutional
adjudication."' 139 The Court has observed in the civil context that "[a]s a
136. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
137. Recognizing a pipeline would not undo the finality of all convictions in postconviction
proceedings. Litigants would need to otherwise qualify for postconviction relief, including
complying with any filing deadlines.
138. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that litigants have little
incentive to press their claims unless any new rule declared in their case would apply to them.
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537 (1991) ("A criminal defendant
usually seeks one thing only on appeal, the reversal of his conviction; future application would
provide little in the way of solace. In this context, without retroactivity at least to the first
successful litigant, the incentive to seek review would be diluted if not lost altogether.").
139. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. States must follow Griffith on this point, at least in civil cases.
See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993) (holding in tax case that
Griffith overturns more restrictive state rule).
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matter of purely judicial mechanics," new rules must apply to similarly
situated individuals, because holding otherwise "breaches the principle
that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a funda-
mental component of stare decisis and the rule of law generally." 1 0
A. The Logic of Griffith
As applied to initial-review collateral proceedings, the logic of
Griffith dictates that cases properly in the postconviction pipeline
receive the benefit of any new rule announced, even if the new rule was
announced after the conviction became final on direct appeal. Because
IAC claims typically are not brought on direct appeal, litigants in initial-
review collateral proceedings are similarly situated to litigants on direct
appeal.14 ' Fairness requires that courts treat people the same regardless
of whether initial review is channeled to direct or collateral
proceedings.
142
Under Griffith, a defendant with a pending appeal may benefit from
a new rule only if the rule relates to an issue properly preserved in the
appeal. 143 Unless finality is pegged to postconviction proceedings in
IAC cases, defendants in states that hear IAC claims in collateral pro-
ceedings will generally derive no benefit from the Griffith rule. 144 The
following three examples illustrate this problem as well as the disparate
treatment of litigants subject to different state procedural schemes. Liti-
gant #1 is in a state that channels IAC claims into direct appeal. 145 While
the appeal is pending, the U.S. Supreme Court announces a new rule
affecting IAC claims. Under Griffith, this litigant straightforwardly
140. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 535, 537. Moreover, the Court in Teague
recognized that the "fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecutions" is a reason that
finality "'should not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation.'" 489 U.S. at 309 (citing
Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38
U.CHI.L.REv. 142, 150 (1970)) (emphasis omitted).
141. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (Where a collateral proceeding is the
defendant's first opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance, "the collateral proceeding is
in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.").
142. Griffith recognized the importance of treating "similarly situated defendants the same."
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
143. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 418 (1991) (requiring that a petitioner have raised in
his appeal the claim pertaining to the newly announced rule); see also United States v.
Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d 1324, 1340 n. 18 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("The Griffith holding ... applies only to
defendants who preserved their objections throughout the trial and appeals process.").
144. Because individuals who accept plea agreements often do not file an appeal, cases
involving a Padilla claim typically have not been appealed.
145. Idaho essentially channels IAC claims into direct appeal in death penalty cases. Although
IAC claims are brought on postconviction rather than on direct appeal, they must be filed within
forty-two days of the entry of judgment and are consolidated with other claims on review before
Idaho's highest court. See Idaho Code § 19-2719(3) & (6).
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receives the benefit of the new rule. Litigant #2 is in a different jurisdic-
tion that uses a system of parallel direct and postconviction proceed-
ings. 146 This litigant files a direct appeal on issues unrelated to IAC but
also raises an IAC claim on postconviction. While both the appeal and
the postconviction claim are pending, the U.S. Supreme Court
announces a new rule relating to the IAC claim. This litigant could argue
that Griffith's appellate pipeline applies because her conviction was not
yet final when the new rule was announced.' 47 She, however, might not
prevail because her pending appeal was unrelated to the IAC claim.'48
Litigant #3 is in one of the many states where postconviction IAC
claims are typically filed after the conclusion of any direct appeal. With-
out a postconviction pipeline, this litigant definitely would not receive
the benefit of any newly announced procedural rule (unless it falls
within one of the narrow Teague exceptions).
These examples illustrate how people are treated differently even
though they each seek initial review of an IAC claim. Without a post-
conviction pipeline, receiving the benefit of a new rule hinges on the
vagaries of a state's system for reviewing claims. Moreover, states like
Arizona (where IAC claims must be brought on postconviction) provide
no forum for litigants to argue for a new rule. In states like Texas
(where IAC claims on direct appeal are theoretically permitted), litigants
would be induced to raise their IAC claims on direct review in order to
avoid the risk of needing to argue for a new rule on postconviction. 149
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that there are good reasons to
146. Only a few states utilize a system of consolidated or parallel proceedings. See Hoffman v.
Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that, in 2001, "only California, Colorado, Idaho, and
Texas ha[d] statutory schemes that require[d] capital defendants to pursue simultaneously post-
conviction and direct appeal claims in appealing to the state's highest court"). It is often
unrealistic to expect that litigants raise IAC claims on direct appeal or on postconviction with a
short filing deadline. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. Rv. 679, 690 (2007)
(because of tight deadlines and the inability to quickly retain new counsel "an overwhelming
majority of defendants do not raise trial attorney ineffectiveness challenges in their motions for a
new trial"). As a result, some litigants in states that require LAC be raised in consolidated or
concurrent proceedings file their claims well after deadlines have passed. See, e.g., Hoffman v.
Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 531 (2001) (review of IAC claim on federal habeas permitted in Idaho case
despite postconviction claim being filed past the deadline of forty-two days after the entry of
judgment) (citing Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1364 (10th Cir.1994); Guinan v. United
States, 6 F.3d 468, 471-73 (7th Cir.1993); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 303-04 (2d
Cir.1995)). These litigants, like litigant #3 described below, would need the postconviction
pipeline to benefit from new rules.
147. Teague arguably does not apply to convictions not yet final, even if the pending appeal is
unrelated to the IAC claim.
148. See supra note 143 for cases holding that an issue must be raised in an appeal for any
newly announced rule to apply.
149. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that procedural rules should "induce litigants to
present their contentions to the right tribunal at the right time." Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500,
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keep IAC claims in postconviction proceedings. 5 ' In Massaro v. U.S.,
the Court ruled that federal defendants need not raise IAC claims on
direct appeal, even where the deficient performance is apparent from the
trial record. 5 ' One ground for the Court's decision was the recognition
that "requiring a criminal defendant to bring ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims on direct appeal" does not "promote" conservation of
judicial resources."' Often, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
require factual investigation outside the trial court record.1 53 As a gen-
eral rule, direct appeal attorneys are neither funded, nor expected, to do
investigations and appellate courts consider only the facts in the trial
court record. Moreover, if an attorney represents a defendant both at trial
and on appeal, the attorney is not likely to file an IAC claim against him
or herself.154 Cognizant of the downsides of funneling IAC claims into
direct appeals, most states at the time Massaro was decided required, or
at least permitted, litigants to raise IAC claims for the first time in post-
504 (2003) (quoting Guinan v. U.S., 6 F.3d 468, 474 (1993) (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (internal
quotations omitted). See also supra Part III.A.
150. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 ("States often have good reasons for initially
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during state collateral proceedings
rather than on direct appellate review.") (citing to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012)). See
also Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1126-29 (1999) (discussing
why most IAC claims are brought in postconviction proceedings).
151. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).
152. Id. Massaro was a federal prisoner who had been convicted of murder in aid of
racketeering, He filed a direct appeal without raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
After this was dismissed, he filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to
vacate his conviction. He argued that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
by rejecting an offer to continue the case after the prosecution had revealed a key piece of
evidence. The district court held that his claim was procedurally barred because he had not raised
it on direct appeal. See id. at 502.
153. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918 (IAC claims often "depend[ ] on evidence outside the trial
record" and developing the record on direct appeal is often constrained by tight deadlines)
(quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 285) (internal quotations omitted). See also Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986) ("Indeed, an accused will often not realize that he has a
meritorious ineffectiveness claim until he begins collateral proceedings, particularly if he retained
trial counsel on direct appeal."); Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 OHio
N.U. L. REv. 597, 609-10 (2011) (discussing the difficulty of gathering evidence for an IAC
claim while incarcerated and without the assistance of counsel).
154. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1917 (recognizing that ineffective assistance claims "normally
require[ ] a different attorney"). See also Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870, 872
(Ky. 1998) (stating that "it is unethical for counsel to assert his or her own ineffectiveness for a
variety of reasons") (citing Kentucky Bar Association Opinion E-321 (July 1987)); People v.
Smith, 863 P.2d 192, 198-99 (Cal. 1993) (noting that "when a defendant claims after trial or
guilty plea that defense counsel was ineffective, and seeks substitute counsel to pursue the claim,
the original attorney is placed in an awkward position" and "[t]he potential for conflict is obvious"
when an "attorney must defend against charges from the very client he or she is supposed to be
representing").
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conviction proceedings.1 55
Under the right conditions, defendants could be better off if IAC
claims were channeled into direct review. 156 But unless direct review
proceedings are extensively revamped to permit new counsel, lengthy
factual investigation, and robust access to the trial court, encouraging
defendants to bring IAC claims on direct appeal would be misguided.
Raising IAC claims on direct appeal is risky for defendants because the
claim is not likely to be granted unless there is an opportunity (and suffi-
cient time) to develop the record. Moreover, once a claim is denied on
direct appeal, it typically cannot be raised again on postconviction.15 7
The rationale of Griffith should compel courts to endorse the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's suggestion in Castaflo that there be a postconvic-
tion pipeline for initial-review claims. The pipeline would include all
cases properly filed in collateral proceedings that are pending, regardless
of whether the case was filed before or after the announcement of a new
rule. 1 58 Such a postconviction pipeline would relate to initial-review
postconviction claims in precisely the same way that Griffith's direct
review pipeline relates to claims that are properly raised at trial and on
direct appeal. The inequity illustrated in the examples above would
disappear.
B. Finality and Comity
An additional reason not to apply Teague in the initial-review col-
lateral context is that the finality and comity concerns underlying that
decision do not exist. Teague's rule that nonretroactive new constitu-
tional rules do not apply in federal habeas review of state convictions
rested on a reluctance to encroach on a state's interest in coming to
closure in a case. 159 The Teague rule "validates reasonable, good-faith
interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though
they are shown to be contrary to later decisions."1 60 But if initial-review
collateral proceedings are tantamount to direct review, any comity con-
cerns arising from federal review of state decisions would be no differ-
ent than in Griffith. In Griffith, the Court did not discuss comity as a
concern when a federal court announces a new rule that overturns a state
155. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 508 ("A growing majority of state courts now follow the rule
we adopt today.").
156. See Primus, supra note 146, at 679 (detailing a proposal to reform the direct appeal
process to permit fair consideration of IAC claims).
157. Id. at 691.
158. This would make the postconviction pipeline analogous to the direct appeal pipeline. For
a discussion of what is included in the direct appeal pipeline. See discussion supra note 27.
159. See discussion supra Part I.
160. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
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conviction on direct appeal.16 With respect to finality, if a claim is inca-
pable of (or discouraged from) being fully raised in a direct appeal, there
can be no finality until the claim is heard on collateral review. 162 Com-
mentators have noted that "finality as to some kinds of attacks ... can-
not possibly set in-because those claims cannot possibly arise, or at
least usually do not arise-until after the direct appellate process has
ended."' 163 As a result, "finality ought not to set in with regard to claims
as to which state law does not provide an 'opportunity for full and fair
litigation' at 'trial and on direct appeal.' ,,6 Justice Harlan, whose retro-
activity jurisprudence was enshrined in Teague, expressed a concern
with finality in cases involving "relitigat[ion]," not initial litigation.
165
C. Stunted Evolution of Norms
A further set of concerns relates to ensuring the evolution of consti-
tutional IAC norms. Unless new constitutional rules like Padilla can be
announced in initial-review collateral proceedings, the constitutional law
on IAC claims cannot evolve. As shown above, Teague prevents federal
courts from ruling on the merits of a constitutional postconviction claim
unless they first decide that the case involves a Teague old rule or a
retroactive new one. 166 This threshold question approach rests on an
implicit assumption that new procedural constitutional rules will natu-
161. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
162. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 508-09.
163. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 21, at § 25.6 (citing to Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680,
688 (1993) ("'restricting the litigation of Sixth Amendment claims to trial and direct review
would seriously interfere with an accused's right to effective representation'") (quoting
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986)). Two commentators cited in Teague
recognized that finality with respect to certain claims should not set in until after postconviction
review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (citing to Henry Friendly and Paul Bator); see
Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L.
REV. 142, 170 (1970) (listing claims that should not be barred on collateral review, including
claims that could not have been raised previously, and suggesting that failure to provide for
review of such claims could constitute a due process violation); Paul M. Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441,454 (1963)
(noting types of cases in which "relitigation serves obvious and appropriate ends"). One court has
observed that Teague does not "come into play" when the constitutional violation "'typically
do[es] not occur until after the trial and direct review are completed."' Sanders v. Sullivan, 900
F.2d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 1990). Otherwise, Teague would "emasculate[ ]" the right in question. Id.
164. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 21, at § 25.6. This approach comports with the role of
habeas as providing a forum for claims for which "no opportunity for full and fair litigation" have
occurred. Id. (citing authorities).
165. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691.
166. This test is the federal Teague threshold test. See discussion supra Part II. Most states
follow Teague, although some do not. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Moreover, if it is
a claim covered by AEDPA, the court must also find that resolution of the case would involve
only "clearly established" law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). See discussion infra notes 189-193
and accompanying text. At least one court has held that, unlike Teague's threshold question, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is not waivable. See Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 784 (6th Cir. 2013).
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rally develop in cases on direct appeal. But IAC claims almost exclu-
sively appear first in postconviction proceedings rather than on direct
appeal. Without a postconviction pipeline, courts would have little
opportunity to make new rules of criminal procedure.
In Padilla, the U.S. Supreme Court faced no potential barrier to
announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure because the
State did not assert Teague as a defense.' 6 7 Padilla involved a state con-
viction that had been upheld by the Kentucky Supreme Court.168 Padilla
sought, and was granted, certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.16 9 Even
though Kentucky follows Teague, it declined to argue that Padilla's
claim was barred on the grounds that it would involve establishing a new
rule. 170 The Court thus was clearly permitted to proceed to the merits of
Padilla's Sixth Amendment claim.
1 71
In its decision in Chaidez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit pointed out the State's waiver of the Teague issue in
Padilla.172 Chaidez had argued that the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court
had ruled on the merits of the Sixth Amendment issue in Padilla without
first deciding whether it was a new rule meant that the Court believed it
to be an old rule. 173 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating "[i]n light of
the fact that Kentucky did not raise Teague as a defense in Padilla, we
do not assign significance to Padilla's procedural posture."' 74 The court
noted that "[w]hile '[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold
question,' Teague 'is not "jurisdictional" in the sense that [the] Court...
must raise and decide the issue sua sponte. ,"1M Before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the federal government argued the same point.
76
167. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
168. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. Teague, in contrast, involved federal habeas review of a
state conviction.
169. See id.
170. Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Ky. 2009) (adopting the Teague test
for retroactivity).
171. As explained above, only in cases in which the government raises a Teague issue is a
court obligated to consider the threshold question of whether the case involves a new rule. See
supra Part II. Padilla was before the Court on a petition for certiorari rather than federal habeas
review. The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled whether a state can assert a Teague defense in a
case involving certiorari on direct review from a state court decision, as opposed to review on
federal habeas. However, states have raised Teague as a defense in cases involving the same
procedural posture as Padilla. See supra note 61.
172. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2011), aff'd, 133 S. Ct.
1103 (2013).
173. See id.
174. Id. at 693.
175. Id. (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1990) (emphasis in original)).
176. The U.S. government argued that "the Teague defense 'is not jurisdictional,' and the State
may waive or forfeit it in individual cases." Brief for the United States at 19, Chaidez v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No. 11-820), 2012 WL 1097108, at *19 (citing Collins, 497 U.S.
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Padilla's procedural oddity is further illustrated by the fact that
Padilla got the benefit of the new rule and Chaidez did not. Under
Teague, "once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case
announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retro-
actively to all who are similarly situated."17 7 But since Padilla did not
address the threshold question of whether it would announce a new rule,
Padilla got the benefit of the decision in his case and no one else with
convictions that were final before Padilla did.
A legacy of Teague is that new, constitutional procedural rules may
not be announced in collateral proceedings unless the State waives the
Teague issue (as in Padilla) or the rule fits a narrow exception to nonret-
roactivity (like Gideon).17 8 Commentators have criticized Teague for its
general stunting effect on the evolution of constitutional law relating to
criminal procedure.1 79 The Teague effect is particularly pronounced in
the IAC context because defendants typically have little meaningful
opportunity to have their IAC claims decided on direct appeal.1 80 Absent
a postconviction pipeline, Teague's threshold test threatens to bar any
development that would be a new constitutional rule.
Martinez itself provides a telling example. The Court observed that
Coleman "left open" the constitutional question of "whether a prisoner
has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide
the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial."''
The Court in Martinez limited its decision to an "equitable ruling," sav-
ing the constitutional question for another day.'8 2 But if Teague applies,
the Court will likely never reach Coleman's unanswered question.
Indeed, in Martinez, Arizona had argued Teague as a bar to relief.
83
at 41; Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1994)) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, "[w]hen a State forfeits the Teague bar, the Court may therefore announce a new rule even
though the case might otherwise have presented Teague issues." Id. Because Kentucky did not
"raise Teague as a defense," the government argued that the Court in Padilla was free to rule on
the merits of the Sixth Amendment issue and its ruling "does not imply any conclusion about
retroactivity." Id.
177. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989). See also supra Part II.
178. See supra note 41.
179. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537, 575
(1991) (Teague reduces lower courts to "ministerial task of putting into operation decisions that
the Supreme Court renders on direct review"). The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that
concerns about constitutional law becoming "ossified" can be valid, at least in cases involving
individual rights. See Davis v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2433 (2011).
180. See discussion of Trevino v. Thaler supra Part I1I.A.
181. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
182. Id. at 1319-20. Because the Court announced a new equitable rule relating to the
operation of federal review of state convictions, rather than a constitutional new rule, Teague's
threshold question rule did not apply and the Court was free to announce the new rule.
183. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 36-41, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (No. 10-
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Teague's threshold test insulates other important questions from
review. Any claim based on facts outside the trial court record could be
barred if the Court finds that a new rule is needed to resolve it. Such
claims might involve newly discovered evidence, improperly withheld
exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland,184 or the failure of coun-
sel to investigate or develop relevant facts. The paralysis of constitu-
tional rule-making in the IAC context is particularly problematic
because the effectiveness of counsel is tagged to prevailing professional
norms under Strickland and are therefore intended to track changes in
the practice of law.185 Thus, by definition, the relevant constitutional
standard is evolving. Unless courts can announce new rules relating to
the scope of Strickland, IAC rulings stand to become increasingly
unhitched from professional norms.
Teague's effect might be limited if applications of Strickland's test
for deficient counsel never resulted in a new rule. Traditionally, applica-
tions of Strickland have been old rules, posing no problem for the evolu-
tion of Sixth Amendment law.' 86 But Chaidez now teaches us that
applications of Strickland can constitute new rules. As professional
norms evolve, courts will inevitably consider whether the Sixth Amend-
ment requires attorneys to advise their clients of other consequences of
their pleas, such as those relating to voting rights, employment, occupa-
tional and professional licensing, business licensing, motor vehicle
licensing, ability to secure government contracts, loans, and grants, gov-
ernment benefits, Second Amendment rights, future sentencing conse-
quences, recreational licenses, and family and domestic rights. 187 One
way out of this predicament would be for the Court to rule that any
future ruling about collateral consequences of pleas would not involve a
new rule. The Court could find that the new rule of Padilla broke the
collateral consequences barrier, making any further expansion of profes-
1001). Martinez responded that there would be no new rule, merely an extension of Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), to another form of
appeal - the initial-review collateral proceeding. Reply Brief at 16-19, Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 1309
(2012) (No. 10-1001). Particularly in light of Chaidez, it is unlikely the Court would agree. See
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2013) ("[W]hen we decided Padilla, we
answered a question about the Sixth Amendment's reach that we had left open[.]").
184. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
185. Under Strickland, the "proper measure of attorney performance" is "reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
186. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No. 11-
820), 2012 WL 2948891, at *15 (noting that "[i]n the three decades since Strickland was decided,
this Court has applied its standard in a multitude of settings, but it has never held that applying
Strickland in new circumstances announced a new rule").
187. The American Bar Association has cataloged numerous consequences of plea agreements
in an online database. NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org.
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sional norms just an application of the old rule of Strickland.188 With
such a ruling, the evolution of IAC constitutional norms in the collateral
consequences area could continue unfettered by Teague. But unless and
until the Court so rules, a postconviction pipeline is required to permit
IAC norms to track the expanding duty of counsel to warn of conse-
quences previously considered collateral by some courts.
In federal habeas cases involving state convictions, the positive
effect of a postconviction pipeline might be limited because of the sepa-
rate, statutory relitigation bar created by AEDPA. Teague is a court-
generated retroactivity rule that applies to federal habeas review of state
convictions "on the merits." 18 9 It co-exists with the federal habeas stat-
ute. The habeas statute, as modified in 1996 by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), poses an additional barrier to
federal court review through its strict "relitigation" bar. 190 A court can-
not overturn a state conviction based on a claim "that was adjudicated on
the merits" in state proceedings unless the state decision "was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fed-
eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 91
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that AEDPA's amend-
ments to the habeas statute "did not codify Teague" and that "the
AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct."' 92 As a result, even if
188. It is unclear the extent to which immigration consequences stand apart from other
consequences that could be described as collateral. The Court in Padilla expressly declined to
characterize immigration consequences as "collateral," stating that it had never used this label to
describe immigration consequences. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. However, part of Justice Kagan's
opinion in Chaidez appears to support the argument that expansion of the Sixth Amendment duty
to include advice about other types of consequences would not announce a new rule. In
explaining why Padilla was a new rule, she noted: "Before Padilla, we had declined to decide
whether the Sixth Amendment had any relevance to a lawyer's advice about matters not part of a
criminal proceeding." 133 U.S. at 1110.
189. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); see also Hertz & Liebman, supra note 21, at
§ 25.2 (retroactivity is a "judge-made and prudential" doctrine).
190. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44. The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized AEDPA's bar as
"'difficult to meet' because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions
as a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' and not as a means
of error correction." Id. at 43-44 (citing Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011))
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
192. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44 (citing Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per curiam)).
Indeed, the Court has expressly left open the question whether AEDPA's relitigation bar would
prevent a federal habeas petitioner from receiving the benefit of a new rule even after it were
found retroactive under Teague. See id. While there are differences between the Teague
retroactivity rule and AEDPA's relitigation bar, the Supreme Court has equated Teague's old/new
rule test with the requirement under the federal habeas statute that law be "clearly established"
before it can serve as a basis for reversing a state conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); see
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000) ("The antiretroactivity rule recognized in Teague,
which prohibits reliance on 'new rules,' is the functional equivalent of a statutory provision
commanding exclusive reliance on 'clearly established law.'). The Court noted that the only
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Teague were held not to apply in initial-review collateral proceedings,
the AEDPA bar will apply in state conviction federal habeas cases, mak-
ing it impossible for new law to evolve in this category of cases. There
may be arguments that AEDPA's bar must align with the postconviction
pipeline. But even if AEDPA stands as an independent bar in federal
habeas cases involving state convictions, the postconviction pipeline
would ensure the availability of all other types of review for the evolu-
tion of IAC rules. These types of review include federal habeas review
of federal convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, state court review of
state convictions, and direct certiorari review of state convictions. 93 As
discussed above, under Danforth, states may be more generous in their
retroactivity analysis than the U.S. Supreme Court.' 94 Even if the U.S.
Supreme Court were to reject the postconviction pipeline, nothing pre-
vents states from embracing it.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court and state courts should adopt the postcon-
viction pipeline described in this article and grounded in both Justice
Pariente's opinion in Castaflo and Chaidez's argument based on Marti-
nez. If an initial-review collateral proceeding is the equivalent of a direct
appeal, it must be treated as a direct appeal for retroactivity purposes. To
hold otherwise would be to raise both constitutional and policy
concerns.
A postconviction pipeline would appropriately reconcile the poten-
tial conflict between the principles of Griffith and Teague. New rules
must be announced. Griffith requires that, once they are, similarly situ-
ated defendants must be given the benefit of the new rule. Teague places
a barrier against announcing new rules in postconviction proceedings.
"caveat" to the equivalence was that that a Teague "old" rule did not necessarily need to be
established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 412. For a discussion of the ways in which the
statutory test differs from Teague, see Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New
Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from
Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 232 n. 126 (2008) (discussing
differences between AEDPA and Teague); see also Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus,
Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 959 (1998) (explaining that
Teague still applies even after AEDPA).
193. As others have noted, AEDPA's relitigation bar and the Teague's new/old rule test have
increased the importance of state court review, federal review of federal convictions, and U.S.
Supreme Court certiorari review of state court decisions. See generally Shay & Lasch, supra note
192; see also Hertz & Liebman, supra note 21, at § 25.1 (AEDPA converts the certiorari petition
process "into a defendant's first and last opportunity to secure relief' on basis of new rule); see
also Spencer v. Georgia, 500 U.S. 960, 960 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari) (stating that certiorari would have been appropriate if the claim could not have been
heard on federal habeas review).
194. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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But since new IAC rules are typically announced on postconviction, the
Teague rule threatens to either forbid the announcing of new IAC rules
or to breach the Griffith prohibition on announcing a new rule without
applying it to similarly situated defendants. The Court in Padilla was
able to thread this needle because the State did not raise Teague as a
defense. As a result, Padilla got the benefit of the new rule announced in
his case, while no one else did.
Teague is aimed at limiting the circumstances under which federal
courts will overturn the actions of a state trial court based on a subse-
quent change in the law. But when a claim is raised for the first time in a
postconviction motion, trial courts should rule according to the most
current law. There is no Teague concern when trial courts use present
day law to make an initial ruling on a claim, regardless of whether that
ruling occurs in postconviction proceedings. In both direct review and
initial-review collateral proceedings, courts should heed Justice Harlan's
call to adjudicate cases "in light of [their] best understanding of gov-
erning constitutional principles." 195 Otherwise, "it is difficult to see why
[courts] should so adjudicate any case at all." 196
The U.S. Supreme Court deferred the pipeline issue in Chaidez,
giving lower federal and state courts an important chance to be heard
first. These courts are now faced with the opportunity to chart a sensible
course through the two shoals of retroactivity jurisprudence created by
Griffith and Teague. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejects
the postconviction pipeline, however, the States can, and should,
embrace it. Others have persuasively argued that States should not fol-
low Teague.'97 But adopting the postconviction pipeline does not require
a categorical rejection of Teague. To the contrary, the postconviction
pipeline aligns with Teague's underlying goal to restrict new rules to
first-tier review.
195. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Id.
197. See Lasch, supra note 21.
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